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TWO VIEWS OF THE CLASS ACTION 
Alexandra D. Lahav*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Class actions present a series of dualities.  There are two dominant views 
of the class action’s structure and two dominant views of the class action 
lawyer.  Some see the class action as an aggregation of individuals, a 
complex joinder device and nothing more.  Others view the class action as 
transforming the class members into an entity.  Similarly, there are two 
dominant views of the class action lawyer.  Many see the class action 
lawyer as an entrepreneur, seeking out litigation and personally benefitting 
from gains accruing to class members.1
The procedural law does not definitively adopt one of these views.  In 
fact, looking to the law to answer the question of what the class is, what the 
class members’ relationship is with counsel, and what the lawyer’s role is 
vis á vis the class yields no definitive answers to these questions.  This is 
because the law of class actions reflects a deep ambivalence about this 
procedural device that can be used to benefit class members and enforce the 
substantive laws, but can also be abused by lawyers seeking to extract rent 
from the class.  At the root of this ambivalence is the relationship between 
the class and its lawyer.  Every lawyer to some extent frames—or forms—
the interests of the client.  On a spectrum of lawyer control and client 
consciousness, the class action seems to be on one extreme end.
  Others view the class action lawyer 
as a public servant or a “private attorney general,” privately vindicating 
rights through lawsuits that public officials do not have the resources to 
pursue. 
2
In this Symposium Essay, I propose a thought experiment in which we 
reconceptualize the relationship between the lawyer and the class as an 
exercise of the lawyer’s imagination.  The class is a phantom client; like a 
ghost, it at once exists and does not exist.  The question is whether the 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.  Many thanks to Judith Resnik for comments 
on a previous draft. 
 1. The less generous might call the lawyer-entrepreneur a “bounty hunter.” See John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:  Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty 
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983). 
 2. We might also fruitfully consider the role of the judge, but that is beyond the scope 
of this essay.  For a few different views of the role of the judge in complex litigation, see 
generally, Martha L. Minow, Judge for the Situation:  Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of 
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997); Jonathan T. Molot, An 
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27 (2003); Judith Resnik, Courts:  
In and Out of Sight, Site and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771 (2008); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
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lawyer’s act of imagining this phantom client is a positive one that realizes 
the goals of the law and serves the needs of the class and of society, or a 
negative one that realizes the goals of self-enrichment at the expense of the 
class, the defendant, and society.  One implication of understanding the 
class as a phantom client is that the requirement that the class representative 
“adequately represent” the interests of the class ought to be seen as a 
mandate for the lawyer to responsibly construct a class client by consulting 
class members through polling.3
In Part I, this Essay describes the two dominant views of the class action, 
as an aggregation of individuals or an entity.  Part II describes the two 
dominant views of the plaintiff’s lawyer in the class action, as an 
entrepreneur or a public servant.  Each of these two introductory sections 
also describes the contradictions and tensions in the law of class actions as 
well as the policy arguments favoring each view of the class and class 
counsel.  Part III proposes an alternative view of the relationship between 
the lawyer and the class client:  the class is a phantom client created by an 
act of the lawyer’s imagination.  By reconceptualizing the class as a 
phantom client we can better understand the tensions and inconsistencies in 
the procedural law.  There is no satisfactory way to resolve the tension 
created when a lawyer is unmoored from a client, as is the case in the class 
action context.  The most commonly advocated solution to this problem is 
to create incentives that will align the interests of the lawyer with those of 
the class.  Perhaps we have maximized the use of incentives to drive class 
counsel toward conduct beneficial for the class and society.  We ought to 
add to the discussion the importance of virtue. 
 
Civil society cannot survive without virtuous citizens.  Nor can the class 
action device survive without virtuous lawyers.  The problem class counsel 
faces is not only resisting the temptation of making a quick fee at the 
expense of the clients.  Lawyers also need to determine what the phantom 
client wants and what the goal of the law is.  These determinations require a 
public discussion of the goals of the law and the best methods for achieving 
those goals.  One way to foster such an exchange of ideas is for class 
counsel to poll class members regarding their goals for the litigation as a 
prelude to settlement and, in doing so, to join together with class members 
in the enterprise of imagining the class as a client. 
 
 3. Much has been written on the adequacy of representation requirement. See, e.g., 
Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. 
REV. 337, 354 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to adequacy of representation 
and stating that “[t]o the extent that the Rules direct courts to focus on the named class 
parties, they provide what is at best a distraction from the real source of legitimacy in class 
actions:  the incentives for faithful representation by class counsel”).  For a recent debate on 
the issue of adequacy, compare Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Adequacy, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. SEE ALSO 55, 57–59 (2010) (critiquing the view of class counsel and class 
representatives as purely self-interested), with Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of 
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2009) (arguing that the standard for adequacy 
of representation on collateral attack ought to be that representation “is adequate if and only 
if the actions of the class representative and class counsel . . . [leave] that class member in no 
worse a position than that class member would have enjoyed had [that member] retained 
control of her own case”). 
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I.  TWO VIEWS OF THE CLASS ACTION:  AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS OR 
ENTITY 
The two dominant schools of thought on the structure of the class action 
consider it to be either an advanced joinder device, merely aggregating 
individual cases, or a transformative procedural rule that creates an entity 
out of a dispersed population of claimants. 
These two views are illustrated in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.,4 a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing 
the question of how to apply the Erie doctrine to class actions brought 
under state law in federal court.5  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates 
provided medical care to a patient who assigned to them her rights to 
insurance benefits under a health insurance policy issued by Allstate 
Insurance.6  Allstate delayed payment and refused to pay the statutory 
interest that had accrued as a result of the late payment.7  Shady Grove 
alleged that it was owed approximately $500 in interest under New York 
law.8  Shady Grove’s lawyers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all the 
providers who had claims for statutory interest based on overdue payments 
from Allstate.9  Now, instead of being confronted with a single suit for 
$500, Allstate faced a collective litigation with an interest penalty in excess 
of $5 million.10
The class counsel filed the lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York.
 
11  The lawyers were able to file the suit there 
because the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) grants broad 
jurisdiction to the federal courts over all class actions where any class 
member is from a different state than any defendant and the matter in 
controversy exceeds $5 million.12  New York’s Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, however, prohibits class actions for statutory penalties.13  Allstate 
argued that this required the federal court to dismiss plaintiffs’ class action 
since Shady Grove sought to obtain a statutory penalty through the class 
action mechanism.14
 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
  The question before the Court was whether the class 
action rule is procedural for Erie purposes, such that Shady Grove could 
maintain its lawsuit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or substantive, so that the New York rule would govern and require 
 5. Id. at 1436. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1436–37. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1437 n.3. 
 11. Id. at 1436. 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).  The statute requires the federal court to remand the 
case to state court when more than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the same 
state as the primary defendant and makes remand discretionary when between one-third and 
two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the same state as the primary defendant. Id. 
§ 1332(d)(3), (4); see also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 13. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2010); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
 14. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
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dismissal of the suit.15  The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, allowed 
the class action certification motion to proceed under Rule 23 rather than 
the New York rule.16
From the defendant’s perspective, a five hundred dollar suit—which was 
all Shady Grove was permitted to maintain under the New York rule—is far 
different from the five million dollar suit Shady Grove sought to maintain 
under the federal rule.
 
17  Because the absent class members had little 
individual interest in filing a lawsuit, whether Allstate would face any 
significant liability would be determined by the certification of the class 
action.18  In the absence of the class action, Allstate was unlikely to face 
more than a handful of small claims actions.19
A plurality of justices asserted that the class action was nothing more 
than a sophisticated joinder device.
  Accordingly, there was a lot 
at stake for Allstate in the case.   
20  Class actions, the opinion explained, 
allow plaintiffs the opportunity to bring together lawsuits that were not 
economical to maintain on their own.21
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), 
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at 
once, instead of in separate suits.  And like traditional joinder, it leaves 
the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision 
unchanged.
  The class action mechanism did not 
alter the substantive law, but instead merely aggregated cases to which the 
substantive law would apply in the same way that it would in any individual 
case.  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, explained: 
22
To the extent that permitting a class action would result in greater liability 
for Allstate, because individuals were unlikely to bring actions on their 
own, the Court explained, this was merely an “‘incidental effect[t]’” of the 
procedural rule.
 
23
By contrast, the dissent saw this class action as an entity, a creation that 
transformed the substantive law.  In the opening lines of the dissenting 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “The Court today approves Shady Grove’s 
attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although the 
State creating the right to recover has proscribed this alchemy.”
  In other words, the plurality adopted wholeheartedly the 
“aggregation of individuals” view of the class action. 
24
 
 15. Id. 
  The 
dissent saw a strong interest on the part of the State of New York to limit 
class actions precisely because class actions can effect this transformation.  
This required the dissent to consider the class action from the perspective of 
 16. Id. at 1448. 
 17. Id. at 1443. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 1443. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
445 (1946)). 
 24. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the defendant and class counsel rather than from the viewpoint of the 
individual absent class members, whose recovery remained at $500 
regardless of the size of the class.  This perspective is consistent with 
(perhaps even required by) the entity view and it changes the outcome.  
Instead of a procedure that does nothing to the substantive law, the dissent 
saw class actions as altering it impermissibly.  The implication of the 
dissent’s position is that in this case the class action rule violated the Rules 
Enabling Act, which prohibits the alteration or enlargement of a substantive 
right.25
Class action doctrine offers little help in choosing between the 
aggregation and entity views.  If the class is an aggregation of individuals, it 
follows that each individual has a right to participate in the class suit just as 
they would in an individual litigation; class members should be permitted to 
choose (or terminate) class counsel, and settlements ought not to be 
approved over their objection.  Yet none of these approaches are the default 
rule in class actions.  The law does not allow class members to choose their 
attorney, to fire her, or to determine her compensation.
 
26  Furthermore, 
settlements may be adopted over the objection of class members.  Absent 
class members cannot intervene in side settlements reached by class 
counsel, defendant, and objecting class members, nor can they obtain 
discovery of those settlements.27  Absent class members are not parties for 
purposes of conducting discovery or making motions for summary 
judgment, but must formally intervene in order to have a say, just as a 
stranger to the litigation would have to do.28
 
 25. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).  The dissent instead preferred 
to argue that there was no direct conflict between the federal and the New York rules and 
therefore the New York rule should govern. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460.  For an 
argument that the class action rule violates the Rules Enabling Act, see generally MARTIN H. 
REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).  For a different view, see Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
17 (2010) (advocating a radical reinterpretation of the Rules Enabling Act); Alexandra 
Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2011) (reviewing 
REDISH, supra). 
  They are not parties to the 
 26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (stating that the court picks the lawyer); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(h) (stating that the court determines compensation); Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 
F.3d 581, 590 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that class counsel need not be disqualified when the 
class representative, who had hired the lawyer, objects to the settlement). But see 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006) (requiring that entity with largest 
financial stake in the relief sought be appointed lead plaintiff and choose class counsel). 
 27. Under Rule 23(e)(5), the court must approve the withdrawal of objections, but this 
does not mean that the terms of a side settlement must be disclosed, and it is not clear under 
what circumstances the terms of such side settlements would be discoverable. See Duhaime 
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1999) (refusing class member 
post-judgment discovery of side settlement). 
 28. See Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Devlin 
held that objecting class members need not intervene in order to appeal. Id. at 14 (majority 
opinion); see also ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 16:1 (4th ed. 2002) (“Absent class members should not be required to participate actively 
during the pretrial and trial stages of the litigation, since such a requirement would impose 
an affirmative obligation, not expressly required by Rule 23 and would frustrate the rule’s 
goals.”) Treatises note some disagreement over whether class members are parties for 
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litigation for diversity jurisdiction purposes.29  Defendants are not required 
to file compulsory counterclaims against them.30  Defendants may contact 
class members for individual settlement prior to class certification, contact 
that would be prohibited in individual representation.31  Finally, a 
settlement or adjudication binds the entire class, precludes class members 
from future litigation, and is only assailable based on the adequacy of the 
class representative.32
From the preceding discussion, it would seem that the entity view has the 
upper hand.  But other doctrines support the aggregation view.  If the entity 
view truly was to prevail, class members would be required to intervene in 
order to appeal.  Yet the Supreme Court has held that objecting class 
members are parties for purposes of appeal.
  All of these rules favor the entity view of class 
actions. 
33  Similarly, under entity 
theory class members’ ability to collaterally attack on the basis that they 
were not adequately represented in the class action ought to be severely 
limited.  Yet courts have been open to permitting class members to 
collaterally attack settlements on adequacy grounds, particularly in cases 
involving future claimants.34
Finally, there are a set of rules relating to class actions that can be 
categorized as supporting both the entity and the aggregation view, or 
perhaps neither.  For example, the tolling of statute of limitations pending 
the outcome of the certification motion, the right to opt out of money 
damages class actions, and the right to participate in fairness hearings are 
all procedural protections that are consistent with both views.
 
35
 
purposes of discovery or counterclaims. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra; cf. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (noting that absent class members “are 
almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs.”).  The 
disagreement largely comes up in the context of defendants wanting to depose absent class 
members, not in the context of absent class members wishing to control the discovery 
process.   
  These are 
all rights that inhere to the individual, recognizing class members as rights 
holders who are entitled to pursue their own litigation and to have their say 
in the pending class action.  At the same time, they are analogous to the 
type of rights that are available to members of entities and have particularly 
apt analogues to the corporate form.  Most of the time shareholders of 
companies may freely sell their shares, just as class members in money 
damages class actions may opt out.  Shareholder meetings, somewhat like 
fairness hearings, allow shareholders to air their views and submit proposals 
 29. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005). 
 30. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 810. 
 31. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 28, § 15:19. 
 32. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (affirming with respect to Stephenson, and 
vacating and remanding with respect to other plaintiffs). 
 33. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 1. 
 34. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261. 
 35. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10 (observing that the statute of limitations is tolled for absent 
class members); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that absent class members be 
permitted to opt out of money damages class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring 
fairness hearings before approval of settlements in class actions). 
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for reform.  And individual shareholders are not liable for the misconduct of 
the company, much as the statute of limitations is tolled for claimants in 
advance of certification. 
The difficulty of choosing one view over the other is illustrated by Lazy 
Oil Co. v. Witco Corp.,36 a case about what happens when sophisticated 
class representatives and class counsel disagree on case strategy.  The 
principal of Lazy Oil, an oil producer named Bennie G. Landers, conceived 
of a lawsuit against Witco, hired a lawyer and pursued the suit as a class 
action.37  Unlike many class actions where the class representative does not 
play a significant role in prosecuting the case, Landers seems to have been 
vigorous and independent-minded.38  When class counsel settled the case, 
these qualities may have been one reason that Lazy Oil and another class 
representative objected to the settlement and moved to have class counsel 
disqualified.39  When the class representatives objected, the lawyers they 
had hired to represent them and the class withdrew from representation of 
the objectors and purported to represent the class in the settlement.40  Lazy 
Oil argued that the situation constituted an impermissible conflict of interest 
because the lawyers were “representing a party (i.e., [the non-objecting 
class]) adverse to [the] one they previously represented (i.e., the 
objectors).”41  The ethics rules forbid a lawyer from representing a party in 
a matter where the former client is now an adversary absent consent of both 
parties.42  If the test for disqualification had been applied to Lazy Oil as it is 
in any ordinary litigation, class counsel would have been disqualified.  
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that class counsel need not be 
disqualified.43  Instead of applying the disqualification rule 
“‘mechanically’” to class actions, the court applied a balancing test, 
weighing the interest of the class in continued representation against the 
prejudice to the objectors.44  The reason for this departure is that a class 
representative could hold hostage, delay, or scuttle a good settlement by 
objecting and thereby disqualifying class counsel.45
What does this doctrine say about the entity and aggregation of 
individuals views of the class?  One might look at the case as a victory for 
the entity view because it implies that the class representative (or any 
individuals within the class for that matter) is not the client, but rather the 
whole class is.  Once the representative objects, he is entitled to some 
   
 
 36. 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 37. See id. at 583. 
 38. See id.  
 39. See id.  
 40. See id.  
 41. Id. at 588. 
 42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2011). 
 43. Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 591. 
 44. Id. at 589–90 (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18–19 
(2d Cir. 1986)) (“[C]lass counsel may continue to represent the remaining class 
representatives and the class, as long as the interest of the class in continued representation 
by experienced counsel is not outweighed by the actual prejudice to the objectors of being 
opposed by their former counsel.”). 
 45. Id. 
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consideration but not to the automatic disqualification of his former 
attorney that an individual client would get.  At the same time, the case also 
supports the aggregation view because it renders meaningless the idea that 
the class representative has any special role in governing the “entity.”  It 
leaves open the question of what happens to this inchoate and leaderless 
group once the class representative objects.  If having meaningful 
leadership is a condition precedent to the creation of an entity, Lazy Oil 
militates against seeing the class this way.  The case supports most strongly 
the notion, discussed below, that the class’s lawyer is unmoored from any 
client at all, be it an entity or an aggregation.    
Many of the leading scholars of class actions have espoused, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the entity view.46  Some analogize the class to a 
political entity.47  Others analogize the class to a corporation.48  Whatever 
the precise analogy, as Samuel Issacharoff, one of the most prominent 
scholars in the law of class actions, explains:  “Classes do take on the form 
of an ‘entity,’ . . . with rather immediate consequences for the prospect of 
successful prosecution of a claim.”49  These consequences include the 
potential that plaintiffs will not be able to vindicate their rights at all if a 
court declines to certify a class, or the possibility that defendants will be 
pressured to settle despite a very low probability of a liability finding 
because the possible losses if that unlikely event occurs are too large to 
tolerate.50
 
 46. The entity theory seems to have been proposed initially by Edward H. Cooper. See 
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23:  Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 
16 (1996); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right To Opt Out 
of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002); Nancy J. Moore, “Who Should 
Regulate Class Action Lawyers?,” 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1477; David L. Shapiro, Class 
Actions:  The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). 
 
 47. See Issacharoff, supra note 3 at 338 (“[I]t is useful to think of the class action 
mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device designed to accomplish some of the same 
functions as performed by the state, particularly in those situations in which the state has not 
or cannot perform its regulatory function, or it would be inefficient for the state to undertake 
such regulation directly.”). 
 48. As John C. Coffee, Jr. explains, “From a governance perspective, a class action is an 
organization, often with thousands of members, that persists for an indefinite period, usually 
several years from the case’s filing to its resolution.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation 
Governance:  Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 306 (2010).  My 
own work has been consistent with Coffee’s approach; see also Alexandra D. Lahav, 
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65 (2003). 
 49. Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 1060 (citing Shapiro, supra note 46, at 917). 
 50. This view was famously advocated by Judges Henry J. Friendly and Richard A. 
Posner. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 118–20 (1973); 
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299–300 (7th Cir. 1995).  For critiques of 
the blackmail argument, see Alexandra D. Lahav, The Curse of Bigness and the Optimal Size 
of Class Actions, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 117 (2010), 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2010/11/Lahav-The-Curse-of-Bigness-
63-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-117-20101.pdf; Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class 
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1386–90 (2003). 
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II.  TWO VIEWS OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWYER:  ENTREPRENEUR OR 
PUBLIC SERVANT 
The doctrine governing the lawyer’s duties to the class is just as unstable 
as the procedural law implicating the nature of the class action.  Class 
counsel has a fiduciary duty to individual class members, which is why 
subclassification is required when the interests of the class representative 
and class members are not aligned.51  At the same time, Rule 23 states that 
the job of class counsel is to represent the interests of the class, not of 
individual class members.52  In fact, the Court has sometimes permitted 
“headless class actions,” allowing a class action to proceed when the class 
representative’s claims are mooted.53  The ethics rules state that unnamed 
class members are not clients and that lawyers need not obtain consent from 
absent class members in the event of a conflict or potential conflict of 
interest.54  As a comment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) explains, lawyers “representing a class of plaintiffs or 
defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-
lawyer relationship with each member of the class.”55  Unlike binary 
litigation, defendants may contact class members before a class is certified 
and, with the court’s permission, may sometimes contact class members 
after class certification.56
Instead of articulating a vision of the nature of the relationship between 
class counsel and the class, the Model Rules defer to the procedural law, 
stating that class counsel “must comply with applicable rules regulating 
notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed 
to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.”
  In sum, the doctrine provides no consistent 
definition of the class action lawyer’s role. 
57  The lack of special 
ethics rules distinguishes the class action from formal entities, which are 
subject to a specialized rule governing lawyer conduct.58
Scholars have stepped into the breach with two views of the class action 
lawyer as entrepreneur or public servant.  The first suggestion is that the 
lawyer is a type of entrepreneur (more negatively referred to as a “bounty 
hunter”) who conceives of the lawsuit, finds the client, and pursues the 
   
 
 51. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–27 (1997) (stating that class 
representative must represent particular interests of class members); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) 
(requiring the court to appoint class counsel); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (treating subclasses as 
a class under the rule). 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class.”). 
 53. See Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions:  A Search for 
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239, 1265 n.118 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 54. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [25] (2011); id. R. 1.8 cmt. [13]. 
 55. Id. R. 1.8 cmt. [13]. 
 56. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 28, § 15:19. 
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. [13].  
 58. See, e.g., id R. 1.13 (governing relationship between counsel and corporation); see 
also Moore, supra note 46 (arguing for specialized professional ethics rules governing the 
lawyer-client relationship in class actions). 
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litigation for private gain.59  The second view of the class action lawyer is 
as a public servant, sometimes called a “private attorney general” who 
furthers the deterrent effect of the law by harnessing the power of 
representative litigation.60
In any agency relationship, there is an incomplete overlap between the 
interests of the principal and those of the agent.  When this gap is 
significant, the agent may seek to take advantage of the principal in order to 
further her own interests.
  Each of these views is a reaction to the central 
problem in class action representation, the agent-principal problem, so a 
brief explanation of that problem is necessary before exploring these 
approaches. 
61
A.  The Lawyer Entrepreneur 
  The agent-principal problem is present in the 
corporate context (between shareholders and directors or management), the 
individual representation context (between lawyer and client), and in the 
class action context (between the lawyer and the class).  The agent-principal 
problem is a crucial issue in the class context because neither the class as a 
whole nor its individual members exercise control over the lawyer.  An 
individual client can threaten to fire the lawyer, but the class cannot.  An 
individual client, particularly the corporate client, may be a repeat player.  
Class members are decidedly not.  Individual clients can negotiate lawyer 
pay and may withhold pay or negotiate discounts, while class members 
cannot.  The class’s lawyer has an incentive to do right by the court, which 
appoints class counsel, fixes attorneys’ fees, and may seek the same lawyer 
again to represent additional classes.  But the lawyer-client relationship in 
the class action context permits none of the safeguards that are supposed to 
prevent lawyers from taking advantage of their clients in ordinary litigation.  
The more extreme problems posed by a relationship between a collective 
and its agent makes the entity model a particularly attractive lens through 
which to view the class action.  Because they exercise little or no control 
over the litigation, it is difficult as a practical matter to see class members 
as an aggregation of individuals.  This lack of individual say suggests a 
collective approach is the right one.  The fairness hearing, right to appeal 
and to collaterally attack are the exceptions to this understanding. 
The description of the class counsel as a type of entrepreneur follows 
very nicely from the entity model of the class action.  The association 
between corporate management and the class action lawyer flows naturally 
from the diagnosis of the agent-principal problem, which was a staple of 
corporate law scholarship long before it was used to analyze the problems 
in class actions.  The problem with the analogy is that its parameters are not 
quite clear. 
 
 59. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888–89 (1987). 
 60. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004). 
 61. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 37–51 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
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Consider first the analogy between the class action lawyer and the 
management of a corporation.  This is a poor analogy for two reasons.  
First, a corporation is created by a legitimating governance structure, a 
feature that is missing in the class action.  Management is appointed by the 
board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders.  This gives both 
management and directors a certain theoretical legitimacy that the class 
action lawyer lacks.  After all, the class counsel is a self-appointed leader 
that serves at the pleasure of the judge, drawing no legitimacy from the 
consent of the class itself.62  Yet perhaps the analogy has more bite as a 
critique.  Many prominent corporate law scholars have criticized the 
method by which directors are elected.  Lucian A. Bebchuk, for example, 
has written that “shareholders do not in fact have at their disposal those 
‘powers of corporate democracy.’  As a result, the shareholder franchise 
does not provide the solid foundation for the legitimacy of directorial power 
that it is supposed to supply.”63  Second, existing corporate governance 
structures do not seem to do a very good job of controlling the agents of the 
corporation as recent concerns about executive pay demonstrate.64
A second analogy, which might be more fitting, is to associate the class 
action lawyer with in-house counsel.  This analogy is not useful because the 
corporation’s lawyer answers to the management and there is no 
management in the class action context.  The exception that proves this rule 
is securities litigation, where a lead plaintiff is empowered to choose class 
counsel.
  Even if 
legitimacy and class member franchise were irrelevant or only a means to 
the end of improving settlement value in class actions, failures in corporate 
governance make it a poor model for addressing the agency problems in 
class actions.   
65  Even then it is by no means clear that the lead plaintiff is 
empowered to control class counsel the way that management can in the 
corporate context.  If there were some kind of class member-management 
committee that could control the lawyer, the past misdeeds of in-house 
lawyers provide little solace that describing the role as in-house class 
counsel guarantees that the lawyer will look out for the best interests of 
class members.66
 
 62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (appointment of class counsel by the court). 
 
 63. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
676 (2007). 
 64. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers & Urs Peyer, The CEO Pay Slice, 
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 679, 2010), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/Bebchuk-Cremers-
Peyer_CEO-Pay-Slice_Sept2010.pdf.  There is some hope for change on the corporate front 
but it is hard to see how readily applicable mechanisms such as staggered boards are to the 
class action context. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered 
Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders:  Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Feb. 3, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1706806 (finding that staggered boards tend to improve shareholder value). 
 65. See Coffee, supra note 48, at 300. 
 66. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 9, 17–25 (2002) (describing the role of lawyers in the Enron scandal); Matthew 
A. Smith, Note, Advice and Complicity, 60 DUKE L. J. 499, 515–17 (2010) (same). 
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A final analogy that has its origins in the business world is the idea of the 
class counsel as an entrepreneur.  This analogy accounts for the fact that the 
lawyer runs the show:  picking the client, defining the class, running the 
litigation, and proposing the amount of compensation to the judge.67  John 
C. Coffee has made an excellent case for this approach, writing that “one 
better understands the behavior of the plaintiff’s attorney in class and 
derivative actions if one views him not as an agent, but more as an 
entrepreneur who regards a litigation as a risky asset that requires 
continuing investment decisions.”68  Taking this analogy to its logical 
endpoint, scholars have recently proposed that in small claims class actions 
the entire settlement should go to the attorneys rather than be distributed 
among class members, in order to realize the deterrent rationale of 
consumer protection laws.69
The lawyer as entrepreneur analogy is in many ways satisfactory because 
it reflects the reality of practice in this area of the law.  But it does not take 
account of any notion of fiduciary duty between the lawyer and the class 
and does not account for the provisions of the law directed at class members 
specifically, creating interests that the lawyer is obligated to protect.  In 
other words, it kills off the client altogether despite what the law in fact 
requires.  This problem is nicely illustrated by the proposal that the interests 
of the class client be taken out of consideration altogether and the award in 
any class action be given directly to the lawyer.  Despite the appeal of this 
approach from the perspective of a deterrence rationale, it does not address 
the fact that the law provides for compensation of class members.
 
70  No 
consumer protection law I know of expressly allocates the proceeds of any 
litigation directly to the lawyers.71
 
 67. Of course there are legal limits on the creation of the class action; the lawyer is not 
permitted to pay plaintiffs or others who bring them cases. Cf. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics 
Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 1016–17 (2009). 
  There are substantial costs to killing off 
the client in this way, even if it does describe the state of affairs on the 
ground in certain class actions. 
 68. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 683–84 (1986). 
 69. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010) (arguing that class action lawyers should receive 100% of the 
proceeds of class actions to create optimal incentives to bring deterrent small claims suits); 
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  The 
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) (arguing that 
in small claims class actions, “[a]ll that matters is whether the practice causes the defendant-
wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions,” not to whom it pays those costs). 
 70. See Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class 
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 498 (1996) (describing the 
problem of settlements providing little or no relief to class members with viable claims). 
 71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006) (imposing a civil penalty of between $100 
and $1000 for violations of the Consumer Credit Reform Act of 1996). 
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B.  The Public Servant 
Courts sometimes say that the class counsel holds a position of “public 
trust.”72  This is the root of the conception of the class action lawyer as a 
public servant or a “private attorney general.”73  The class counsel as 
private attorney general supplements the work of public officials by 
bringing actions government lawyers do not have the resources to pursue.74
There are several problems with the private attorney general conception 
of the class action lawyer.
   
75  The first is the substantive law.  While it is 
certainly true that many consumer protection laws have a deterrent function, 
and some even provide for statutory damages or fee shifting in order to 
realize this deterrent goal, these laws also require compensation to 
individual plaintiffs.76
Second, the incentive structure in the private attorney general model is 
flawed.  These flaws are evoked by the pejorative term “bounty hunter.”
  To the extent that compensation is a goal, albeit not 
the only goal, the lawsuit has to proceed at least in part on behalf of class 
members rather than the public at large.  The lawyer in that case is not only 
a public servant but also a fiduciary to the class.  Calling the lawyer a 
private attorney general does not solve the problem of how to define that 
duty. 
77  
The private attorney general is meant to supplement the enforcement of 
public attorneys general and regulatory agencies.  To the extent that private 
attorneys general merely piggyback on regulatory work already done, they 
are not serving this supplemental enforcement and deterrence function.78  
Whether this is the case or not, just as whether there is in fact over-
deterrence, is an empirical question that has not been satisfactorily 
answered.  The rationale for “coattail” suits is that they further the 
deterrence goals of the law by increasing penalties to defendants and they 
compensate plaintiffs.79
 
 72. See, e.g., Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1294 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985). 
  But if the lawyers accept lower settlements in 
order to obtain a benefit for themselves (at the expense of the class), then 
such “coattail” actions are rightly criticized.  As Coffee has explained: 
 73. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 60, at 2130–31 (presenting a taxonomy of uses of 
the private attorney general concept and arguing for a more nuanced view of the clients the 
attorney is serving and what their interests are). 
 74. For example, in the debate over CAFA, fourteen state Attorneys General wrote in 
opposition to a notice provision in the Act that “class actions provide an important ‘private 
attorney general’ supplement to our efforts to obtain redress for violations of state consumer 
protection, civil rights, labor, public health and environmental laws.” 150 CONG. REC. 14,366 
(2004). 
 75. For a critique that has stood the test of time, see Coffee, supra note 1. 
 76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(g), 1681n(a) (barring retailers from reprinting more 
than five digits of a customer’s credit card number, providing a minimum of $100 in 
statutory damages, and allowing for attorney’s fees for successful suits). 
 77. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 218. 
 78. Id. at 220–26. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions:  
Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass 
Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 79. See generally Erichson, supra note 78. 
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 The problem then is two-fold:  First, when the private attorney general 
becomes a “free rider,” society loses the promise . . . that private 
resources would supplement public efforts in the detection of law 
violations by bringing actions that otherwise would not have been 
initiated.  Second, the ability of private law enforcement to create a 
credible penalty structure is undercut if the private watchdog can be 
bought off by tossing him the juicy bone of a higher-than-ordinary fee 
award in return for his acceptance of an inadequate settlement.80
The reason for these flaws brings us to the third criticism, which is that the 
private attorney general has no client to discipline her behavior. 
 
The absence of a client to answer to is a serious flaw of the private 
attorney general approach, one that mimics the problems associated with 
the entrepreneurial model.  They are really two sides of the same coin.  The 
lawyer who is independent from any client discipline is more likely to settle 
for a suboptimal amount, more likely to work in a crowded field where the 
distribution of fees among the many lawyers who raced to the courthouse 
will dilute the incentive of lawyers to file suits in the future, and more likely 
to seek out cases based on governmental action because the cost of 
independently searching out clients and strong lawsuits is very high.81  The 
risk that the class counsel would not live up to the public trust spurred a 
provision in CAFA requiring notice of class action settlements to 
appropriate state and federal officials.82  This notice provision garnered 
significant criticism from state Attorneys General.83  Although not opposed 
to the idea of notice itself, they worried that such a requirement might lull 
class members and judges into thinking that the state Attorneys General 
would protect absent class members’ interests.  Financial and administrative 
constraints limit the ability of state officials to review a settlement 
adequately and intervene if it is unfair.84
The fourth and final problem with the private attorney general model is 
that there is no universally agreed-upon definition of the “public good” by 
which her performance can be judged.  As Austin Sarat has observed, “[t]he 
public interest is a notoriously slippery concept that generally does little or 
no analytic work.”
 
85
 
 80. Coffee, supra note 
  In a pluralist society, there are multiple conceptions of 
the public good.  For example, when lawyers bring consumer class actions 
against financial institutions, do these lawsuits deter future misconduct and 
compensate claimants for violations, or merely extract rent from the 
companies that will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees?  
If the former, these suits serve the public good.  If the latter, they serve the 
private interests of the lawyers.  As we do not have an empirical answer to 
1, at 226. 
 81. Id. at 234–35; see also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be 
Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 162–63 (2001). 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 1715. 
 83. See supra note 74. 
 84. See Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:  Optimal Regulatory 
Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1975 (2008). 
 85. Austin Sarat, The Profession Versus the Public Interest:  Reflections on Two 
Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1497 (2002). 
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this question, we are left with a series of nearly baseless suppositions.  This 
is why the debate about whether class actions are in the public interest is so 
dissatisfying. 
Upon closer inspection, the public interest begins to look like the “vaguer 
sanctions of conscience,” to use Oliver Wendell Holmes’s phrase.86  The 
law does not always make clear what the public interest is, or at least what 
conception of the public interest has been adopted by democratically elected 
bodies.  It is much easier to deduce what is in the financial interest of the 
lawyer and what her private incentives must be than to determine what is 
truly in the “public interest.”  Consider class action suits for statutory 
damages.  If a company has violated a consumer protection law with respect 
to a million consumers and the law provides a $1000 statutory penalty, the 
lawsuit will cost the company $1 billion.87  Is pursuing such a penalty, even 
if it is permitted by law, in the public interest?  Does the class action 
lawsuit lead to an absurd result, as some courts have held in striking down 
such suits, or does it realize the intent of the legislature which should only 
be amended by democratic processes?88  Furthermore, the lawyers’ private 
interests need not always be pecuniary.  In the civil rights context, for 
example, lawyers have been accused of privileging their own ideological 
preferences over those of their relatively unorganized clients.89
III.  A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT:  THE PHANTOM CLIENT 
   
The two most convincing approaches to the class action lawyer, as an 
entrepreneur and as a public servant, liberate the lawyer from her client.  
For this reason they are each an incomplete account for how the law 
simultaneously recognizes and ignores the class client.  There is a way of 
integrating the law’s conflicted approach to the class client and that is to 
understand the class action as a work of the lawyer’s imagination.  Perhaps 
the client was killed off, but still she returns to haunt the lawyer.  The class 
is a phantom client. 
What does it mean to say that the class counsel constructs the client as an 
exercise of imagination?  What I mean by this is that the class definition, 
which is a requirement for the certification of a class, is a construct of the 
lawyer.  This is the crucial insight of the “entrepreneurial” model of class 
action litigation.  The lawyer defines the parameters of the class and, in so 
doing, also defines—sometimes in dialogue with the courts—the class’s 
goals and ultimately its recovery.  The class action is not the only context 
 
 86. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). 
 87. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 25–27 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(Newman, J., concurring) (discussing the due process implications of certifying a class 
action brought on behalf of one million cable subscribers under a privacy law that provided a 
$1000 statutory penalty to each absent class member). 
 88. See id.; see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten:  The Problem of 
Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103 (2009) (arguing against statutory 
damages class actions on due process grounds). 
 89. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
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where the lawyer’s construction of the client’s goals might be questioned.  
It is merely on one extreme end of the spectrum of lawyer-client 
relationships. 
But how does the lawyer construct this definition, which then becomes 
the class?  Constructing the class is an act of imagination, that range of 
mental activities that relates to the individual’s “capacity to conceive of 
objects or experiences not presently available to the senses.”90  From the 
perspective of a cognitive psychologist, imagination can mean the capacity 
for any “counterfactual process of thinking,” that is, the construction of 
alternatives.91  From the perspective of a social psychologist, imagination 
can mean the way “in which individuals gain emotional understanding” of 
others.92  Finally, from a psychoanalytic perspective, imagination may be 
“the mind’s creative capacity for conceiving of desires, needs, and wishes 
in words and images.”93
Poets and lawyers often place law or reason in opposition to imagination.  
As the poet Wallace Stevens, who was also a lawyer, once wrote:  “The 
reason (like the law, which is only a form of the reason) is a jealous 
mistress.”
  For the purpose of this Essay, it is enough to 
speak broadly of a creative mental process that allows us to see things not 
directly before us.  This is what the class action lawyer must do for a class 
to exist at all. 
94
The Romanticist
  But law need not be understood as the opposite of imagination.  
In fact, sometimes imagination allows the goals of reason and of law to be 
realized.  Imagination, in other words, may be the route to justice. 
95
Ethical science arranges the elements which poetry has created, and 
propounds schemes and proposes examples of civil and domestic life:  nor 
is it for want of admirable doctrines that men hate, and despise, and 
censure, and deceive, and subjugate one another.  But poetry acts in 
another diviner manner.  It awakens and enlarges the mind itself by 
rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of 
thought.  Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and 
makes familiar objects as if they were not familiar.
 poet Percy Bysshe Shelley explained: 
96
The Romanticist poets saw the world through a lens of the “double problem 
of making a new world and making it in the knowledge that man is both 
creative and limited, a doer and a sufferer, infinite in spirit and finite in 
 
 
 90. Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 177 (2010). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 177–78. 
 93. Id. at 178.   
 94. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side:  Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal 
Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1990) (quoting Letter from Wallace Stevens to 
Barbara Church (Sept. 29, 1952), in LETTERS OF WALLACE STEVENS, at 761 (H. Stevens ed., 
1966)). 
 95. The proper usage of the terms “Romantic” and “Romanticism” has been the subject 
of intense debate.  Here, I adopt by inference Jacques Barzun’s definition, which defines 
Romanticism both by a set of artists, poets, and writers prominent during a historical period 
and an attitude or approach. See JACQUES BARZUN, CLASSIC, ROMANTIC AND MODERN 14–17 
(2d ed. 1961). 
 96. PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY 33 (1904). 
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action.”97  They saw themselves as undertaking a project of reconstruction 
and in this project valued the human traits of energy, moral enthusiasm, and 
original genius.  As much as they saw the potential of man’s creativity to 
overcome problems, they were keenly aware of “man’s wretchedness.”98
This duality is also a critical component of the problem facing the 
modern class action.  Shelley’s wife was Mary Shelley, most famous for 
writing the novel Frankenstein.
 
99  That monster, a creature of its creator’s 
imagination and meant to evoke the dangers of modern science, has 
sometimes been used as a metaphor for class action lawyers’ misconduct.100
In more recent times, philosophers such as Martha C. Nussbaum have 
argued that imagination is necessary to achieving a just legal system 
because it allows us to empathize with others.
  
The lawyer’s imaginative role may be analogized to two romanticist visions 
inspired by the two Shelleys:  the savior of the world and the destroyer of it. 
101  Nussbaum’s argument is 
chiefly about the value of literature, but it might be applied to the 
imaginative faculty of any person, including a lawyer, who is put in the 
position of making a decision on behalf of another.  Imagination, in this 
sense, is a form of reality testing.  It allows people “to make realistic 
choices from among imagined alternatives.”102  But as Anne C. Dailey 
points out, striking the right balance between fantasy and reality is not 
always easy:  “The creative imagination has a central role to play in 
producing alternatives to the present state of affairs.  It also . . . can stray 
too far from reality and, if not controlled, can undermine the individual’s 
ability to assess realistically the available options.”103
Consider the role that imagination plays in the class action.  To sustain a 
class action, the class needs to be defined.  Who is to create this definition 
but the lawyer through a thought exercise?  A lot is riding on this exercise 
of imagination.  To the extent that the lawyer correctly identifies the 
parameters of the class and is able to construct a narrative about its shared 
interests, a class action may be sustained and wrongs remedied.  But to the 
extent that the lawyer misidentifies the class or its interests, class members 
may be left without compensation or with less than they are entitled to.  The 
lawyer might also disgorge so little from the defendant that the lawsuit has 
minimal deterrent effect and perpetuates injustice. 
 
One example is the case where class counsel seeks to settle a lawsuit 
without seeking compensation for certain groups of class members.  In 
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp.,104
 
 97. BARZUN, supra note 
 for example, a lawsuit was brought 
95, at 17. 
 98. Id. at 16. 
 99. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, at iii (Candace Ward ed., Dover Publ’ns 1994) (3d 
ed. 1831). 
 100. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:  Myth, Reality, 
and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). 
 101. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE:  THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 
AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995). 
 102. Dailey, supra note 90, at 189. 
 103. Id. at 187. 
 104. 356 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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arising out of the sale of consumers’ personal information without their 
permission.105  In the settlement, a portion of the class received no 
compensation.106  Defending this outcome, both sides argued that the 
uncompensated class members received vindication, in the form of the 
satisfaction that defendant did pay something to someone, even if not to 
them.107
Such a claim would not be a sure bet, but colorable legal claims are not 
worthless merely because they may not prevail at trial.  A colorable claim 
may have considerable settlement value (and not merely nuisance 
settlement value) because the defendant may no more want to assume a 
nontrivial risk of losing than the plaintiff does.
  The court rejected this rationale, explaining: 
108
The class counsel in this case imputed interests to the class membership, as 
did the judge.  But both were exercises of imagination.   
 
 Similarly, albeit with opposite results, in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance 
Co.,109 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the use of a 
mandatory class action to resolve antitrust claims against a title company 
through injunctive relief rather than compensatory damages.110  Putative 
class members attempted to file their own lawsuit, arguing that their money 
damages claims could not be resolved through a mandatory injunctive class 
action.  The court found that although they had been adequately represented 
in the first suit for purposes of foreclosing their claims to injunctive relief, 
because they did not have the right to opt out of the first lawsuit they were 
not precluded from pursuing their monetary damages claims.111
 All class actions share a basic common element:  the interests of the class 
are imputed rather than ascertained, as no provision in the procedural law 
requires a lawyer to canvass the class and find out individual members’ 
shared desires.  This act of imagination is the most pronounced in two of 
the more controversial aspects of class actions:  fluid recovery and cy pres 
remedies.  Fluid recovery encompasses various forms of indirect recovery 
to a group of persons similarly situated but not identical with the class.
  This case 
raises the question of how much the initial act of imagination should matter 
when it emerges that the actual class members, who have been trapped 
within the construct created by the class’s lawyers, disagree with the 
lawyer’s decisions.   
112
 
 105. Id. at 782. 
  
For example, when a public transit system overcharges its customers, it is 
 106. Id. at 782–83. 
 107. Id. at 783. 
 108. Id.  Ultimately the court found that the claims discussed in this opinion were in fact 
worthless. See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We 
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 109. 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (stating writ of 
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 110. Id. at 387, 389. 
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 112. 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 28, § 10:17. 
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impossible to determine who those persons were and to compensate them 
directly.  Instead of attempting to find the original victims, the court might 
order the transportation authority to lower fares for present riders for a 
period of time.113  Courts have largely rejected fluid recovery schemes by 
focusing on the narrowest possible definition of the class and requiring a 
tight linkage between the harm to class members and the remedy.114
Courts have been more open to cy pres distributions in the settlement 
context, although these too remain highly controversial.
 
115  The doctrine 
allows the court to direct settlement money that otherwise cannot go to 
individual class members to the next best use.  After the court or lawyers 
have attempted to find individual class members to provide them with their 
recovery, there may be monies left over because some class members 
cannot be identified.  Those sums may be distributed in ways that reflect the 
spirit of righting the wrong at issue.116  While some courts have permitted 
funds to be given to uses unrelated to the litigation,117 the general standard 
for cy pres distributions is that there be a nexus between the proposed use 
of the fund and the class on whose behalf the suit was brought or between 
the proposed use and the underlying purpose of the statutes that the lawsuit 
was brought to vindicate.118
Cy pres distributions have been criticized for violating the ideal that 
litigation is meant to compensate individuals who were harmed.  For 
example, Judge Richard A. Posner has written: 
 
In the class action context the reason for appealing to cy pres is to prevent 
the defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free because of 
the infeasibility of distributing the proceeds of the settlement . . . to the 
class members.  There is no indirect benefit to the class from the 
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362 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (approving a cy pres distribution in an antitrust class action to NFL 
Youth Education Town Centers which “ha[d] some involvement in the same area of 
commerce as the subject matter of the law suit (football or sports-related activities)”). 
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defendant’s giving the money to someone else.  In such a case the “cy 
pres” remedy . . . is purely punitive.119
This is not quite right because the law may recognize a deterrence rationale 
for the award of damages that is not a punishment, at least in the retributive 
sense of the term.  In any event, the line between compensatory and 
punitive damages is conceptually difficult to draw because both can serve a 
deterrent function.  There is no logical requirement that a deterrent remedy 
need also compensate the affected persons directly.  It is certainly possible 
to imagine class members consenting to the redistribution of small amounts 
of compensatory damages to other, more beneficial uses.  The problem is 
that the class action rule does not provide a mechanism for finding absent 
class members and polling them on this issue.  Therefore we must ask:  is 
the act of imagining the next best use beneficial or detrimental to the class 
and society as a whole? 
 
There is both a positive side and a negative side of the construction of a 
class client out of an unformed number of individuals.  On the positive side 
of the ledger, the act of imagination allows lawyers to pursue cases, 
especially small claims actions, that would not be brought otherwise 
because class members do not know the law and, in any event, the amounts 
at stake are too small to justify independent suits (even in small claims 
court).  On the negative side, the class action allows the lawyer to construct 
the clients’ interests in ways that benefit the lawyer at the expense of the 
clients.  The more significant the outcome of the lawsuit to the lives of 
individuals, the more serious the consequences of the act of imagination can 
be for the clients.  Even the most lauded class action litigations, such as 
injunctive actions seeking to integrate public schools in the South, have 
been criticized on these grounds.  Derrick Bell wrote in the 1970s that the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
had assumed 
a perpetual retainer authorizing a lifelong effort to obtain racially 
balanced schools. . . . [and] fail[ed] to reflect any significant change in 
representational policy from a decade ago, when virtually all blacks 
assumed that integration was the best means of achieving a quality 
education . . . , to the present time, when many black parents are 
disenchanted with the educational results of integration.120
Lawyer imagination spurs the creation of new doctrines, thus the 
allowance in Rule 11 for the pursuit of novel legal claims.
 
121
 
 119. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Martin 
H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the 
Modern Class Action:  A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 622–23 
(2010) (arguing that cy pres awards are an example of class actions exceeding the bounds of 
the law in part because they create the illusion of class member compensation).   
  But it can 
also treat with brutal force the heterogeneous interests of class members.  
 120. Bell, supra note 89, at 492. 
 121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring that lawyers certify that the claims and 
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Imagination is necessary to the creation of the class action but also makes 
us wary of it.  In the end, the problem with class actions is not too much 
imagination, but the direction that imagination takes. 
Part of what makes the act of imagination, the creation of the phantom 
client, possible is the self-interest of the lawyer.  It is the lawyer, after all, 
who is engaged in the act of imagining the needs, wishes, and desires of the 
phantom client.  In one of his most beautiful poems, Wallace Stevens wrote 
of a man playing on a blue guitar:  “Things as they are/Are changed upon 
the blue guitar.”122  Tough-minded realism is represented by “things as they 
are” and tender-minded idealism by the “blue guitar.”123
It is a truism in class action scholarship that the interests of the lawyer 
drive the class action; this is also the greatest criticism of class actions.  A 
virtuous lawyer would leave little for scholars to write about, after all.  
Consider the following quote from the Russian author, Nikolai Gogol: 
  These opposites 
exist simultaneously.  Stevens does not try to find a synthesis for this 
dialectic, but recognizes that both things exist at the same time.  So too does 
the class action lawyer experience both the demands of self-interest and 
fiduciary duty. 
 So I haven’t chosen a man of virtue for my hero, and I can explain 
why:  the poor virtuous man must be given a well-earned rest, because the 
very phrase virtuous man is beginning to sound shallow on people’s lips, 
because the virtuous man is being turned into a sort of horse and there’s 
no author who hasn’t ridden him, urging him on with his whip or 
whatever comes to hand.  And so, they’ve exhausted the virtuous man; 
there’s not even a trace of virtue left in him, and indeed he has nothing 
left but skin and ribs.  And all this because they’ve used the virtuous man 
hypocritically, because they don’t respect him!  Now I feel the time has 
come to make use of a rogue.  So let’s harness him for a change!124
In the law of class actions by contrast, we have been harnessing the rogue 
for some time.  Class action lawyers have been seen by scholars and judges 
as a type of Holmesian bad man “who cares only for the material 
consequences which [knowledge of the law] enables him to predict, not as a 
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or 
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”
 
125  This approach, as 
Robert W. Gordon points out, “discards the traditional roles for lawyers as 
seekers of justice, social mediators, and curators of the legal framework.”126  
Holmes himself did not intend the “bad man” to represent a complete 
picture of the capacity of the lawyer in society.127
 
 122. WALLACE STEVENS, “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
WALLACE STEVENS 165 (Vintage Books 1990) (1954). 
  In an address to the 
Suffolk Bar Association in 1885, Holmes described a rousing vision of the 
lawyer’s relationship to law:  “Nor will his task be done until, by the 
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farthest stretch of human imagination, he has seen as with his eyes the birth 
and growth of society, and by the farthest stretch of reason he has 
understood the philosophy of its being.”128
Proceduralists ought to be concerned that in our attempts to “harness the 
rogue” class action attorney, we assist in turning him into one.  When 
proposals for class action reform focus solely on incentives to align the 
interests of class members with the lawyer, an assumption that the lawyer’s 
role is purely self-interested becomes imbedded in the law, encouraging 
self-interested behavior.  But lawyers’ self-interest is not enough to produce 
beneficial results for class members.  Because the class is formed, 
especially in the class action context, by the lawyer’s imagination, it matters 
whether that lawyer is a rogue or a hero. 
 
But can the class action lawyer be something other than a rogue or a bad 
person maximizing her own self-interest?  Is the only counterpoint the 
“vaguer sanctions of conscience” that the lawyer’s duty to the public trust 
evokes?  Is it possible for a virtuous class counsel to represent responsibly a 
disaggregated and dispersed group of persons to whom that lawyer cannot 
really answer directly because of the structure not only of the class action 
rule but also of modern life?  These questions have been at the heart of the 
study of professional responsibility for the last twenty years.  Scholars have 
tried to find something more in the lawyer than a rational self-maximizer 
who pursues private goals with the hope of some public gain as a side 
benefit.129  In the class action scholarship, there have been a few voices 
trying to reconstitute the phantom client.130
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHANTOM CLIENT THEORY FOR THE TWO 
VIEWS OF THE CLASS ACTION AND A MODEST PROPOSAL 
  But for the most part class 
action scholars have accepted what seem like indisputable facts:  the client 
is a phantom—as good as dead—and the lawyer is a rogue. 
The fact that the class client is only a phantom helps us understand the 
tension expressed in the doctrine between the aggregation of individuals 
view and the entity view of the class.  The structure of the class action rule 
(and sometimes the structure of substantive laws that lawyers seek to 
vindicate using that rule) is such that there is no cohesive client on which to 
rely.  This is the reason for the various doctrines that support the entity view 
of the class action:  settlement may be approved over the objection of 
individual class members; individual class members are not entitled to full 
disclosure with respect to the content of side settlements entered into by 
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class counsel; and myriad other rules policing the lines between absent class 
members and persons with a decision-making role in the class action.   
At the same time, the procedural law seeks to help the lawyer construct 
that client by giving class members a voice.  These procedural rules include 
soliciting class members’ views at fairness hearings, allowing class 
members to collaterally attack settlements where representation was 
inadequate, and allowing objecting class members to appeal without 
formally having to intervene.  All this is a peripatetic attempt to bring the 
lawyer into line by giving form to a client that really does not exist.  The 
lawyer unmoored from the client, as we have seen, is a recipe both for 
beneficial exercises of imagination and bad behavior. 
So what is to be done about the phantom client?  The tension between the 
aggregation and entity views of the class action, like the tension between 
the entrepreneur and public servant views of class counsel, is not 
resolvable.  The lawyer is both the savior of the public interest and the 
destroyer of it.  Incentives, in the form of fee regimes that reward lawyer 
actions which inhere to the benefits of the class, and monitoring, in the form 
of court oversight and the encouragement of objectors, are key components 
to ensuring that the lawyer acts for the benefit of the class even as class 
counsel seeks to make a fortune from the litigation.131  But there is one 
more component that is rarely addressed because it seems so “soft,” 
although I think upon reflection it is quite important, and that is the role of 
virtue in lawyering.132
The lawyer is sometimes a rogue, but the more our system accepts this as 
true and seeks to harness the rogue, the more our system creates roguish 
behavior.  Instead of only looking at the lawyer as a rogue, it might be 
useful (and at any rate it would be refreshing) to see the lawyer as capable 
of redemption.  In addition to being a “bad man” seeking to maximize self-
interest, there should be room to see the lawyer as a “custodian of the 
law.”
 
133
 
 131. See generally Lahav, supra note 
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between citizens, the bar, the judiciary, and the legislature about what the 
law is and ought to be. 
One way to begin this conversation is by seeing the phantom client as a 
resource for opinions with respect to the direction of the class.  Rather than 
relying solely on the class representative to represent the “interests” of the 
class, this approach would shift the locus of the inquiry into the class’s 
interests to the absent class members themselves.  This could be done by 
polling the class.  The lawyer’s role in this poll is to frame the debate, just 
as the lawyer frames the parameters of the class itself and frames issues for 
clients in ordinary binary litigation.  Lawyers frame the debate by 
determining what questions ought to be asked of the class and how to ask 
them. 
Polls have been suggested before.134  As far as I can tell, the suggestion 
that class counsel poll the class has never been implemented although a poll 
that is based on a sufficiently large, randomly selected sample of class 
members should not be prohibitively expensive.  One reason for the 
omission is the Rule itself.  Rule 23 does not require the lawyer to canvass 
the class but instead relies on a very thin notion of representation.135  
Representation can mean many things and need not invoke popular self-
government.136  In the class action context, the class representative is 
merely a person authorized to act on behalf of a constituency.  The basis for 
this is that the class representative looks like the class in relevant ways by 
virtue of meeting the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).137
Just because the class representative is a sort of mirror of the class does 
not mean she is not a distorted one.
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members could differ about the litigation in various ways, determining 
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differences.  That can only be done by going to class members themselves.  
This approach opens up a can of worms from the perspective of class 
counsel and the judge.  But that difference of opinion (and its resolution) is 
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class is and the parameters of its interests is crucial to a fair resolution of a 
class action lawsuit. 
This policy proposal is one modest change that the reconceptualization of 
the class as a phantom client inspires.  Polling does not resolve the 
contradictions in the law of class actions or the difficulty of determining 
who this phantom client is.  In fact, if members of the class who are polled 
disagree among themselves or with counsel as to the purpose of the 
litigation or their preferred outcome, this proposal only complicates an 
already complicated litigation. 
To avoid or bury conflict is not the answer.  The philosopher Stuart 
Hampshire argues that the management of conflict, rather than the 
resolution of it through substantive principles, is the hallmark of a just 
society.139  I disagree with Hampshire to the extent he implies that 
substance and procedure can be separated and that universal procedural 
principles can resolve disputes without recourse to substantive 
principles.140  Nevertheless, there is something to be said for the role of 
litigation in managing conflict as part of the maintenance of a just society 
and a just legal system.141  The model for resolving conflict ought to be 
dialogue, not repression.  Hampshire’s observation that there is no 
permanent harmonious equilibrium in a pluralist society,142
Legal philosopher Benjamin C. Zipursky has written that “the perception 
that one’s integrity is under attack—the pangs of conscience and self-
reproach felt, from time to time—may actually be a positive force in the life 
of the lawyer.”
 strikes me as 
very apt to the class action context.  The class action is a process, and one 
that needs to give some kind of form to the phantom class.  We need not 
resign ourselves to the idea that this form comes only from the self-
appointed lawyer or class representative who acts largely for their own 
personal interests.  Instead, we can harness this process to aid in the class 
counsel’s (and the class representatives’) reflection about the ultimate goals 
and needs of the phantom client. 
143
 
  These pangs can only be felt when there is the higher 
expectation of virtuous conduct.  The first step to encouraging that more 
virtuous class counsel is to commence a dialogue about the purpose, scope, 
and ultimate goals, not only of the class action device, but of the class she 
seeks to represent. 
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